Employees Discharged in Retaliation for
Resisting Employers' Antitrust Violations:
The Need for a Federal Remedy
Eight employees, claiming to have been discharged1 for refusing to take part in their respective employers' antitrust violations,
recently filed suits in federal court.2 Each plaintiff sought relief
under section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides a private damage action for "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
Five courts dismissed the suits4 or directed a verdict 5 for the employer-defendants on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege
an antitrust injury or lacked antitrust standing.' Two courts held
1 One of the employees resigned from his job, but alleged he was forced to do so by
threats from his employer. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). This comment treats forced resignation as
equivalent to discharge.
2 Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded,103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (involving two
plaintiffs); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Booth v.
Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp., No. 81-3670 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1982) (on file with the University of Chicago Law Review).
3 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section 4 is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can
sue for damages incurred from violations of any of the substantive sections of the antitrust
laws.
, Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514,
517 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1261 (1983); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F.
Supp. 550, 559-61 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1390
(S.D. Ind. 1982); Booth v. Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp., No. 81-3670, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 28, 1982). In Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976), an
employee who was discharged for giving information about his employer's pricing practices
to two dealers bringing antitrust suits against the employer was found not to have suffered
antitrust injury, since the discharge arose from the "fact of the litigation" rather than from
the underlying violations. The court noted in dicta, however, that loss of sales commissions
and bonuses might be cognizable injuries arising directly from the alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 197-98.
5 McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
6 A plaintiff must satisfy two threshold requirements to recover antitrust damages: he
must demonstrate "antitrust injury," i.e., he must allege an injury for which the antitrust
laws were meant to provide a remedy, see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977), and must have "antitrust standing," i.e., the particular plaintiff filing
suit must be the proper party to maintain a private action for treble damages, see Associ-
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similarly situated plaintiffs to have stated a cause of action.'
Since these cases were decided, many commentators have argued that employees discharged for refusing to participate in the
antitrust violations of their employers have a cause of action under
section 4.1 This comment examines the legislative histories of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts 9 and the antitrust doctrine created by
the courts to reach the opposite conclusion. Part I briefly discusses
the current case law. Part II concludes from the legislative history

ated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 & n.31
(1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977). A number of lower courts treat both elements together under
the heading of "standing." See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th
Cir. 1982), (distinction between antitrust injury and antitrust standing unclear), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387,
1389 (S.D. Ind. 1982) ("distinction between [standing and injury] is vague at best, and, in
this case at least, is of little or no importance"). The Supreme Court has recently suggested,
however, that the term "standing," because of its association with the constitutional "case
or controversy" requirement of article III, U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, may be inappropriate for
characterizing those plaintiffs who may recover for alleged antitrust injuries under § 4:
"Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action." Associated Gen. Contractors v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 n.31 (1983).
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 780-81
(W.D. Pa. 1982). Two other courts hinted they were inclined to recognize such a cause of
action but said they were bound by the contrary precedent of their circuits. McNulty v.
Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F.
Supp. 1387, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1982). In Bowen v. Wohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex.
1975), the court found that a former manager of a shoe store who was discharged because
she was simultaneously operating another shoe store could bring a § 4 suit against her former employer in her capacity as a competing entrepreneur, and added that she might recover her loss of salary and other employee benefits as well.
8 Note, Antitrust Standing After Associated General Contractors: The Issue of Employee Retaliatory Discharge,63 B.U.L. Rlv. 983 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Antitrust Standing]; Comment, Discharged Employees: Should They Ever Have Antitrust
Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 839 (1983); Note, Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1846 (1983) [hereinafter cited at Note, Employee Standing]; Comment, Employee Standing in Private Antitrust Suits: A New Element in the Balance, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 878 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Private Antitrust Suits]; 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 173; Note, Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co.: Antitrust Standing Under Section 4: A Departurefrom the Definitional Approach, 3 PACE L. REv. 739 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Definitional Approach]; see
also Altman, Antitrust: A New Tool for OrganizedLabor, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 127, 128, 16970 (1982) (arguing in favor of standing for unions and employees). But see Note, Standing
of the Terminated Employee Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rv.
341, 357-72 (1983) (arguing that traditional lower court standing tests do not justify § 4
suits by discharged employees).
9 Section 4 of the Clayton Act is largely a recodification of § 7 of the Sherman Act. See
infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Thus the legislative histories of both acts are
relevant to the interpretation of § 4 of the Clayton Act.

DischargedEmployees

19841

that Congress was primarily interested in enforcing the antitrust
laws by creating an effective remedy for consumers who suffered
price overcharges from monopolization of certain interstate markets,'0 and not by providing a remedy to discharged employees.
Part III finds that contemporary judicial doctrine limits the class
of eligible section 4 plaintiffs to those whose injuries reflect the
economic loss to society of a defendant's anticompetitive actions, 1
and concludes that discharged employees, because their injuries result from resistance to their employers' actions and not from the
anticompetitive effects of those actions, fall outside that limitation.
Despite the conclusion that federal antitrust law is unconcerned with employer-employee coercion, the final section of this
comment argues that employees are nonetheless uniquely well situ-

ated to discover and expose antitrust violations, and should be protected in so doing. The comment concludes that employees could
best be protected by a no-retaliation amendment to the antitrust
laws rather than by an ad hoc extension of the Clayton Act's treble
damage provision.

I.

RECENT EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASES

Six of the eight employees who brought section 4 suits 2 to recover for retaliatory discharge had held high managerial positions
in their companies.'3 According to their pleadings, each plaintiff
10 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 904 & n.20 (1983).
" See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1976).
1 In addition to bringing suit based pn § 4, one former employee also sought relief
through a grievance procedure. Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 777 & n.2
(W.D. Pa. 1982). Several employees combined their § 4 claims with pendent state wrongfuldischarge claims but were uniformly unsuccessful. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp.
655, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 561-63 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387, 1388-89 (S.D. Ind. 1982); see also
Shaw, 542 F. Supp. at 779 (plaintiff permitted to amend complaint to include wrongful
discharge claim).
13 Bichan was the president of Chemetron Corporation's Industrial Gas Division.
Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514, 515
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). Ostrofe was the marketing director of
H.S. Crocker Company, a paper label manufacturer. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d
1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). McNulty was a
sales manager for Borden, Inc. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D. Pa.
1982). Callahan and Brown had held sales management positions with Scott Paper Company for 24 and 13 years respectively, Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 552
(E.D. Pa. 1982). Booth was a retail store manager. Booth v. Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp.,
No. 81-3670, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1982). Shaw was a truckdriver. Shaw v. Russell
Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 777 (W.D. Pa. 1982). The eighth plaintiff's position is
unreported. Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
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became aware of what he deemed to be unlawful anticompetitive
activity on the part of his employer and resisted by attempting to
perform his job in a lawful, pro-competitive manner. 4 In response
to their resistance, the plaintiffs' employers fired them or forced
them to resign, in some cases after exerting extreme pressure on
them to cooperate. 15 Two of the former employees claimed to have
been blacklisted from their industries following their discharges.'
The plaintiffs claimed damages for lost salary, bonuses, opportunities for advancement, and diminished reputations.17 In one case,
the plaintiffs also sought to enjoin their former employer's antitrust violations.'"
The lower courts addressing these claims apparently agreed
that the plaintiffs' loss of employment constituted an injury to
14 Bichan deviated from the established practice in his industry by competing for cus-

tomers allocated to other gas producers. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas
Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
Ostrofe refused to aid his employer in a conspiracy among label manufacturers to rig bids,
fix prices, and allocate markets. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). McNulty refused to offer deals to one
supermarket chain that were not offered to competitors. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 655, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Callahan and Brown, upon learning that Scott Paper Company was offering discounts and promotional allowances to favored customers only, exposed
and attempted to halt this practice. Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 552 (E.D.
Pa. 1982). Shaw refused to violate Pennsylvania law by driving trucks loaded above a maximum weight allowance, tried to persuade other drivers to follow his example, and
threatened to notify authorities of the practice of overloading. Shaw v. Russell Trucking
Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 777, 781 (W.D. Pa. 1982). It is unclear what provision of the antitrust laws Shaw considered his employer's practice to violate. Plaintiff Perry refused to induce exclusive dealings with retailers by means of pay-offs and fraudulent credits, or to tie
pet-care product sales to carpet-care product sales. Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F.
Supp. 1387, 1387-89 (S.D. Ind. 1982). Booth refused to carry out practices allegedly designed
to promote price discrimination and resale price maintenance. Booth v. Radio Shack Div.,
Tandy Corp., No. 81-3670, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan 28, 1982).
16 In Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983), for example, Ostrofe's superiors allegedly warned him
that he would sacrifice promised compensation and a greater share in the company's management and that he would be discharged and blacklisted from the industry unless he
stopped interfering with the unlawful scheme.
16Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514,
515 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670
F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). While the
Bichan court did not discuss the alleged boycott, the Ostrofe court found the boycott aimed
at Ostrofe to be itself a violation of the Sherman Act, 670 F.2d at 1381.
11 See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681
F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982) (lost salary and bonuses), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983);
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (diminished compensation, opportunity to increase sales, potential for advancement, and reputation).
18 Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 552-53 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The court did
not address the request for injunctive relief because it found the plaintiffs' claims not to be
cognizable under the antitrust laws. Id. at 561 n.2.
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"business or property" within the meaning of the Clayton Act 1 9
but disagreed both as to whether the plaintiffs had "standing" to
sue under section 4 and as to the appropriate inquiry to undertake
in resolving that issue. In Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.,2 0 the Seventh Circuit applied the "target area" test, which limits the section
4 remedy to plaintiffs within the market threatened, by virtue of
the antitrust violation, with a breakdown of competition.2 1 Because
the conspiracy alleged by Bichan was targeted at the industrial gas
market and not at the labor market, the Court held that Bichan's
discharge was not cognizable under the antitrust laws.2 2 By contrast, in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,2s the Ninth Circuit criticized
the target area test, among others,2" for leading to inconsistent results25 and applied a "balancing of competing policy interests" approach to find that the importance of employee suits to effective
antitrust enforcement outweighed their potential for "vexatious litigation and excessive liability."2 The court thus held that a complaint alleging a plaintiff's discharge in retaliation for opposing the
anticompetitive practices of his employer stated a cause of action
under section 4.
Four district courts from the Third Circuit, which purportedly
followed a "balancing of factors" approach in determining the propriety of section 4 suits,2 8 reached disparate results.2 9 One federal

9 This issue was discussed expressly by only one court. See McNulty v. Borden, Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In other contexts, however, the courts have recognized that loss of employment can be a cognizable injury under § 4. See, e.g., Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 447-48, 454 (1957) (employee claiming that he was
prevented from gaining employment by an anticompetitive labor boycott held to state § 4
claim); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967) ("[O]ne who
has been damaged by loss of employment as a result of a violation of the antitrust laws is
'injured in his business or property'... ."); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419
(7th Cir. 1942) ("business or property" includes employment).
20 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
"

Id. at 516.

" Id. at 517.
-3 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
" In addition to rejecting the "target area" test of Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,

221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955), the Ninth Circuit also rejected the "direct injury" test of
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1973), and the "zone of interests" test of Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975). See Ostrofe,
670 F.2d at 1378, 1382 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
15 670 F.2d at 1382.
26 Id. at 1383.
27Id.
28 See Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) ("§ 4 standing analysis is essentially a balancing test comprised of many constant and variable factors

....
"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1978).

" Compare Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 781 (W.D. Pa. 1982), with
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judge in the Western District of Pennsylvania followed Ostrofe to
hold that a discharge in retaliation for refusing to participate in an
alleged antitrust conspiracy is cognizable because it "flows directly" from the unlawful conduct.3 0 Three judges from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held otherwise. The first summarily
held that only actual purchasers have standing to complain of
price discriminations in violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton
Act, 1 and not employees allegedly fired in furtherance of the conspiracy to discriminate. 2 The second found it "manifest" that the
antitrust laws were designed only to protect plaintiffs at whom the
defendant directed its anticompetitive practices, or whose injury
was otherwise "a consequence of a breakdown in competitive conditions";33 the court held that discharged employees satisfied
neither test. The third court denied standing on the ground that a
discharge in retaliation for opposing an employer's antitrust violation does not "directly result[] from the economic effects" of the
alleged violation. 4 Since the decisions in these cases, the Supreme
Court has, as a general matter, rejected the analyses the courts
used for determining the scope of section 4 standing and injury, 5
but it has not addressed the subject of employee suits in
particular.3 6
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 4
The literal language of the Clayton Act is broad enough to encompass every harm directly or indirectly attributable to an antitrust violation.3 7 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized,
Booth v. Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp., No. 81-3670, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1982);
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1982); and McNulty v. Borden,
542 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
30 Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776, 780-81 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
3 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
"2 Booth v. Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp., No. 81-3670, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28,
1982).
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
McNulty v. Borden, 542 F. Supp. 655, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
35 In Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 907-08 & n.33 (1983), the Court explicitly rejected the tests that had been developed by
the lower courts for determining § 4 standing. Instead, the Court called for an open-ended,
multi-factor inquiry.
3' The Court subsequently vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe, and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). The Court denied certiorari to the Seventh
Circuit in Bichan, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983)
3" Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897,
904 (1983). See supra text accompanying note 3 for statutory language.
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however, that such an open-ended reading of the statute is not
what Congress intended 8 and that courts should limit treble-damage awards to those injuries that reflect Congress's core concerns. 9
This section examines the legislative history of the antitrust laws
to determine whether employee suits properly fall within that core.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914,40 is largely a
recodification of section 7 of the Sherman Act of 1890.

41

The legis-

lative history of that earlier provision demonstrates that Congress
was chiefly concerned with creating an effective weapon against the
giant trusts and combinations that then dominated certain interstate markets.42 By creating a private right of action, Congress
hoped to supplement the limited enforcement resources of the gov38 See, e.g., id. at 905-07 (Congress assumed common law rules would apply to and
constrain antitrust suits); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) ("It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an
antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold damages. .. ."); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972) ("Congress did not intend the antitrust laws
to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation.").
1,Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897,
910 (1983) ("In each case [the plaintiff union's] alleged injury must be analyzed to determine whether it is of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall."); Blue
Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 481 (1982) ("We turn finally to the manner in which the
injury alleged reflects Congress' core concerns in prohibiting the antitrust defendants'
course of conduct."); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
("Plaintiffs must prove... injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent

4' Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
41 Compare Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982), quoted supra text accompanying
note 3, with Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) ("Any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of
anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act... ") repealed by Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
411 Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897,
904 & n.20 (1983).
43 See, e.g., 51 CONG. Rsc. 9185 (1914) (statement of Rep. Helvering) ("It must be plain
that few corporations will care to run the risk of pursuing illegal methods knowing that they
will make themselves liable ... for the payment of damages to all parties injured."), reprinted in 2

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws AND

RELATED

STATUTES

1304 (E. Kintner ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATVE HIsToRY]; id. at 16,274 (statement of Rep. Webb) ("[Section 4] will have a more deterrent effect on the men who practice
these things than a mere criminal penalty ... ."), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATV HISTORY,
supra, at 2771; id. at 16,274-75 (statement of Rep. Webb) ("[Tihe first 'tooth' [in the legislation] ... is in section 4 .... If the Attorney General should be negligent, the individual
himself has a wide-open door to go into court and sue.") reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 2771-72; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) ("These
private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and detecting violations."); Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALz L.J. 809, 849 (1977):
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ernment445 and to ensure compensation for the victims of monopoly
pricing.

Despite congressional interest in private enforcement, the legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests that Congress never
intended a private right of action under the Sherman Act to be
available to employees discharged for opposing their employers'
antitrust violations. Members of Congress simply assumed that
only competitors 45 and consumers46 would utilize the private civil
remedy. The typical suit envisioned was that of distant consumers
"injured in small sums by the advanced price which they have
been compelled to pay.' 4 7 Congress demonstrated its interest in

vigorous private enforcement in the provisions in both the Sherman and Clayton Acts for treble damages, 4 8 liberalized venue,'4 9 re-

Because of budgetary considerations, the government must concentrate its resources on
a few antitrust cases each year, and it must seek consent decrees rather than penalties
in nearly all other cases. In contrast, the prospect of treble damages encourages private
parties to bring some of the suits not brought by the government.
44 Senator Sherman said of the measure that was to become § 7 of the Sherman Act"The measure of damages, whether merely compensatory, putative [sic], or vindictive, is a
matter of detail depending upon the judgment of Congress ....
[This] section is to give to
private parties a remedy for personal injury caused by such a combination." 21 CONG. REC.
2456 (1890), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 114-15. Twenty-four
years later, in debate over enactment of the Clayton Act, Representative Webb hailed the
private remedy: "This section opens the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be
injured by those who violate the antitrust laws, and gives the injured party ample damages
for the wrong suffered." 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 43, at 1192.
45 21 CONG. RC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George) ("By the use of this organized
force of wealth and money the small men engaged in competition ... are crushed out, and
that is the great evil at which all this legislation ought to be directed."), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 43, at 284; see also 51 CONG. REc. 9090 (1914) (statement
of Rep. Mitchell) ("[T]hose who had been crushed and driven out of business were left
without a remedy.. . . "), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 1229; 20
CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. George) (bill should "put an end forever to the
pratice ... of large corporations... so arranging that they dictate to the people of this
country... what they shall receive when they selL"), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 43, at 77.
46 "Who is this party injured, when ...
there has been an advance in the price by the
combination? ... The consumer is the party 'damnified or injured."' 21 CONG. REC. 1767
(1890), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 99 (statement of Sen. George);
see also 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. George) ("I am extremely anxious
that some bill shall.. . put an end forever to the practice ... of large corporations ... so
arranging that they dictate to the people of this country what they shall pay when they
purchase. . . . "), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 77.
47 21 CONG. REc. 3148 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George, arguing for aggregation of small
claims), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 285; see also 21 CONG. REC.
1768 (1890) (remarks of Sen. George) ("It is manifest that in nearly every instance the damage by the advanced price of each article affected by these combinations would be-though
in the aggregate large, indeed-so small as not to justify the expense and trouble of a suit in
a distant court."), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 100.
48 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
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covery of attorney's fees, 50 and waiver of the minimum amount
usually required for federal jurisdiction. 1 The provision for treble
damages reflects Congress's belief that, were only single or double
damages available,5 2 the small amounts recoverable compared to
the cost and difficulty of bringing antitrust suitsas would discourage private actions, thereby frustrating the deterrent purposes of
the private right of action.5 4 Congress never expressly considered
extending treble damages to discharged employees, who have easier access to proof of both the underlying violation and their own
injuries than does the average antitrust plaintiff.
Extension of the private right of action to employees is made
more doubtful still by the lack of evidence that Congress intended
to abrogate the then pervasive contract doctrines allowing employees to be discharged at will. 55 On the contrary, Senator Sherman
himself expressly disclaimed any intention of "announc[ing] a new
principle of law" 56 or interfering with existing state law. 57 The

209, 210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
49See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 904 n.20 (1983). The venue provisions were further broadened when § 7 of the Sherman
Act was reenacted in 1914 as § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §15 (1982)). Under the
original act, venue would lie "in the district in which the defendant resides or is found."
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283. Under § 4, venue in antitrust actions lies either where "the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
209, 210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
51 Id.
52 An early version of the Act provided for recovery of actual damages only, S.1, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1889), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATwE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 89, but
was amended by the Senate Committee on Finance to provide double damages, 1 LEGISLArive HISTORY, supra note 43, at 93, and then by the Committee on the Judiciary to provide
treble damages, id. at 277.
3 See, e.g., 21 CoNG. REC.2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("My own opinion is
that the damages should be commensurate with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit
against a combination such as is described."), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra
note 43, at 114.
" See Associated Gen. Contractors v, California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 904 n.20 (1983); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). An alternative
justification for the treble damages remedy offered by several recent commentators is that
treble damages provide approximately the appropriate amount of deterrence since many
violations go undetected. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 544 (2d ed. 1981);
Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U.
CHi. L. REv. 467, 472, 476 (1980).
a5For a discussion of these doctrines, see Comment, Protecting the Private Sector AtWill Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinantsof
Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. Rsv. 777, 782.
"See 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATr HIsTORY, supra note 43,
at 114.
57 Id.("The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United States to apply the
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stated purpose of the bill was much narrower: to federalize the
then-existing common law of restraints of trade and thereby to
remedy the inability of state courts to reach combinations of interstate scope and effect.5
Finally, it is significant to note that Congress deleted an early
provision of the Sherman Act that would have extended the protection of the Act to any person, partnership, or corporation driven
out of business for refusing "to become a party" to an unlawful
antitrust combination. 59 As explained by Senator Sherman, the

purpose of this section was to "protect a weak person from being
compelled... by threats or intimidation against being forced into
a combination of this kind ....
,,6o While it is unclear whether
this provision would have provided relief for the employees seeking
recovery under section 4 today,"1 the provision itself is telling evidence that the statute's draftsmen distinguished between persons
injured for refusal to participate in antitrust conspiracies and
those injured "by reason of" the violation itself. Under the present
wording of the Clayton Act, only the latter group may sue under
section 4.
Courts and commentators that find employee suits cognizable
under section 4 have ignored these express statements of limitation
and the telling omissions in the legislative history and have concentrated instead on the enactors' interests in vigorous antitrust
same remedies against combinations which injuriously affect the interests of the United
States that have been applied in the several States to protect local interests."); see also 21
CONG. REc. 3146 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Hoar) ("We have affirmed the old doctrine of the
common law in regard to all interstate and international commercial transactions, and have
clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doctrine ... "), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 282.
" 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("The power of the State
Courts has been repeatedly exercised to set aside such combinations as I shall hereafter
show, but these courts are limited in their jurisdiction to the State, and.., are admitted to
be unable to deal with the great evil that now threatens us."), reprinted in 1 LEGISLAT
HISTORY, supra note 43, at 114.

" The Senate bill read in part:
[I]f one of the purposes of any such arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, or combination shall be to compel any person, partnership, or corporation to become a party
thereto, or to cease from doing any lawful business .-.. the person, partnership, or
corporation injured thereby may sue ....
S. 3445, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1889), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43,
at 74.
60 21 CONG. REC. 1168 (1889), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 69.
61 The wording of the proposed provision allowed recovery only to persons who would
themselves have been a "party" to the agreement and so probably would not have covered
all agents of the offending corporations. Cf. infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing scope of employee liability under the criminal provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts).
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enforcement.6 2 Allowing treble damage suits by employees discharged for refusal to cooperate with an anticompetitive scheme, it
is argued, would help expose antitrust violations otherwise likely to
remain undetected, 3 and would deter antitrust violations by
presenting employers with the unattractive choice between effecting unlawful policies over the resistance of employees or risking
lawsuits and exposure of the violations by discharging insubordinate employees. This reliance on Congress's overall purpose
without regard for the specific legislative history of the Sherman
Act is misguided. The treble damage remedy was enacted to provide consumers who been charged excessive prices sufficient incentive to sue, 4 not to remove the contractual disincentives facing
employees in their efforts to resist the anticompetitive schemes of
their employers. However compelling the argument that such employees deserve protection, that policy judgment is nowhere found
in the legislative history of either the Sherman Act or the Clayton
Act.
The Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. 5 argued to
the contrary, inferring congressional concern with employee behavior from the fact that the Sherman and Clayton Acts both impose
criminal liability on corporate agents.6 6 Liability of low-level and
managerial employees, however, is not clear from the statutory language of either provision; both provisions seem to apply only to
parties to the unlawful agreement and not to those merely charged
with its execution. 7 It is significant that no cases in which non'2 See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Note, Employee Standing, supra note 8, at 1847-48.
13 Cf. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 43, at 847 & n.172 ("[Tihe detection rate of antitrust violations is much lower than that of other crimes because an antitrust violation 'is
usually a concealed crime and there is rarely an identifiable victim who is aware of the
violation.' ") (quoting Statement before the Tenth New England Antitrust Conference, Nov.
20, 1976, reprinted in 790 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (1976)); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1319, 1329 & n.47 (1973)
(effects of violations are difficult to distinguish from those of legitimate competition since
victims often do not know antitrust law and since violations such as price-fixing that would
most likely give rise to successful suits are the most difficult to detect).
64 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
6- 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
61 Id. at 1387-88; see also Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 8, at 994. ("Congress
[by imposing criminal liability on corporate agents] indicated that it was fundamentally
concerned with employee participation in anticompetitive schemes.").
"I Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall ... engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Sherman Act thus limits criminal liability to actual
parties to the combination of conspiracy. Section 14 of the Clayton Act reads:
Whenever a corporation shall violate any of the penal provisions of the antitrust laws,
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officers or non-directors were indicted or convicted have been reported.68 Even if one were to assume that all employees were subject to criminal liability, the fact that Congress chose to deter employee participation in antitrust violations through threats of
prosecution does not demonstrate a decision to protect their resistance as well. The potential unsoundness of imposing a statutory
duty without providing protection for employees who would carry
it out is not an excuse for stretching the statute beyond its intended reach. 9
III.

JUDICIAL

DOCTRINES CONSTRUING SECTION

4

Under current law, antitrust plaintiffs must meet three independent requirements for recovery under section 4.70 First, under
the doctrine of "antitrust injury" announced in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 1 the injury for which damages are
sought must be related to the anticompetitive effects of the challenged conduct. Second, even where the Brunswick test is satisfied,
the injury must not be too "remote" or "indirect" to justify the
awarding of treble damages. 7 2 Third, section 4 suits must be dissuch violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or
agents of such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts
constituting in whole or in part such violation ....
15 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). Employee liability under the Clayton Act seems to depend only on
the employee's having "done" any of the acts constituting such a violation; employees who
do not participate in the agreement itself, however, may lack the necessary mens rea for
criminal liability, see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (knowing participation
element of criminal liability under the antitrust laws); 21 CONG. Rzc. 140 (1889) (statement
of Sen. Turpie) ("The essence of the trust is the guilty intention of the conspirators."); 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 43, at 92.
" The early cases discuss only the liability of directors and officers. See e.g., United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 407 n.1 (1962) ("[T]he Solicitor General cites 40 cases in which
corporate officers were indicated under the Sherman Act between 1890 and 1914."), id. at
416 ("[A] corporate officer is subject to prosecution under § 1 of the Sherman Act whenever
he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy-be
he one who authorizes, orders or helps perpetrate the crime.. . ."); Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386, 434 (1945) (suggesting that the statutory term "agents" refers
to officers and directors).
69 Otherwise, the same argument would support a cause of action for employees discharged for resisting an employer's conspiracy to violate the tax laws, or any other law imposing criminal liability on corporate officers, for example, the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §11904
(Supp. IV 1978). Where Congress has decided to confer such a cause of action, it has done
so explicitly. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
70 The analysis in this part follows that of Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 47384 (1982).
7- 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
712 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 728 n.7 (1977).
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missed if the judicial complexities of allocating speculative or duplicative recoveries threaten to undermine effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws.73 While the loss of a job for refusing to participate in an employer's anticompetitive scheme arguably implicates
neither the concern with remoteness nor the concern with duplicative recovery, 74 this section will demonstrate that employee suits
are nonetheless barred for failure to meet the Brunswick
75
requirement.
A.

Brunswick Antitrust Injury

In Brunswick, a unanimous Court held that only those injuries
that "reflect the anticompetitive effect" of an alleged antitrust violation are compensable under section 4. 7 1 Brunswick itself concerned the allegedly unlawful acquisition of defaulting bowling
centers by a bowling equipment manufacturer. The Court held
that competing bowling center owners could not recover damages
for profits they would have realized had their defaulting competitors gone out of business. The Court reasoned that even if the ac77
quisition had been unlawful under section 7 of the Clayton Act,
73 Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897,
911-912 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 475 n.11 (1982); Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
14 See, e.g., Note, Employee Standing,supra note 8, at 1862-65.
"IMost courts and commentators have regarded the finding of a Brunswick "antitrust
injury" to be a necessary prerequisite for section 4 recovery. See, e.g., Bichan v. Chemetron
Corp. (In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation), 681 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1235 (6th
Cir. 1981); Page, supra note 54, at 497; Note, Antitrust Standing, supra note 8, at 1004;
Note, Employee Standing, supra note 8, at 1848. The Supreme Court itself, however, has
been less clear on the subject. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908-910 (1983) (Brunswick one of many factors discussed by the Court in determining propriety of § 4 suit); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S.
465, 483 n.19 (1982) (Brunswick "one factor to be considered in determining redressability
of a particular... injury under § 4."). That plaintiff-employees may suffer injuries which
are not too remote and which present little danger of judicial complexity does not, however,
justify a departure from the antitrust-injury requirement of Brunswick. Brunswick stated in
absolute terms that "[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury," 429 U.S. at 489 (emphasis
omitted), and grounded this dictate in the "by reason of" language of § 4. See id. at 488
("[I]t is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was not 'by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.' "). Moreover, a brief examination of Supreme Court decisions
reveals that the antitrust injury requirement is implicit in questions of remoteness and duplicative recovery, since only a prior showing of anticompetitive effects will trigger the latter
inquiries. Cf. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982) (second half of test for
remoteness restates Brunswick antitrust injury requirement); id. at 474-75 (risk of duplicative recovery engendered by tracing anticompetitive effects along full chain of distribution).
76 429 U.S. at 489.
7 15 U.S.C. §18 (1982). Section 7 prohibits acquisitions that may substantially lessen
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the monopoly power of the new entrant was not the cause of the
plaintiffs' lost profits; the effect of the acquisition on the plaintiffs
would have been the same had no antitrust violation occurred.78
Because the plaintiffs suffered from increased competition-an
"'injury" for which compensation would be antithetical to the antitrust laws' purposes-relief was denied. The court stated:
We ... hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on
account of section 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market.
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and
that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.7 9
The antitrust laws are concerned with acts that concentrate
market power and lead to the market inefficiencies of restricted
output and raised prices.8 0 Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat fell outside section
7 because it was injured by a side effect of an unlawful merger (the
continued operation of failing competitors) and not by that aspect
of the merger (Brunswick's share of market power) that threatened
to lessen competition. 81 Recalling that the antitrust laws "were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not competitors,' -182 the
Brunswick Court reasoned that to allow Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat recovery would mean that "all dislocations caused by the merger- are
actionable, regardless of whether those dislocations have anything
to do with the reason the merger was condemned." ' s
Brunswick articulates a concern that damages recovered in
section 4 suits reflect the economic loss to the market that is the
chief concern of the antitrust laws. 4 Allowing recovery by discharged employees would not advance that concern. An employee's
dilemma between participating in an antitrust violation and risking the loss of his job may be an immediate consequence of an
employer embarking on an anticompetitive course of action. Nonetheless, the employee's injury bears no relation to the anticompeticompetition or tend to create monopolies.
78 429
79

U.S. at 487-88.
Id. at 489.
See 1 P. AREMA &-D.

'o
TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAw
103-05 (1978).
81 Cf. Page, supra note 54, at 471 ("[A]ntitrust injury... narrow[s] the standard for

recoverable damages from all those suffered by the plaintiff as a result of an antitrust violation to those that actually flow from the aspect of the violation that causes market
inefficiency.").
82429 U.S. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).

" Id. at 487.
N See Page, supra note 54, at 476-487.
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tive effects of the employer's activities. Were the employer violating the securities, tax, or any other laws, the employee's dilemma
would be the same. By the same token, the extent of the effect on
competition of the employer's scheme is irrelevant to the measure
of the employee's injury. To allow employees to recover treble
damages for their discharges would divorce antitrust damages from
those harms to the market with which Congress was primarily
concerned.
B.

The Reach of Brunswick

Commentators advocating section 4 recovery for discharged
employees have sought to ignore the implications of the antitrust
injury requirement by arguing that Brunswick stands only for the
proposition that lower courts should not "divorce[] antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust laws"85 by awarding damages for injuries suffered as a result of increased competition."6
While the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Blue Shield v.
McCready 7 contains some general language to this effect, 88 a
closer analysis of that case, and of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Associated General Contractsv. CaliforniaState Council
8 9 demonstrates that
of Carpenters,
Brunswick cannot be so
limited.
McCready concerned an allegedly unlawful conspiracy in the
psychotherapy market brought about through a group health insurance plan that reimbursed its subscribers for treatment by psys5Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
56See Note, Employee Standing, supra note 8, at 1849-50 & n.16; Comment, Private
Antitrust Suits, supra note 8, at 892-93 & n.116; see Note, DefinitionalApproach, supra
note 8, at 765-66. The court in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded, 103 S.Ct. 1244 (1983), tried to limit Brunswick further by questioning its applicability to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 670 F.2d at 1386. This suggestion was then picked up by one commentator who concludes that Brunswick applies only to
mergers, presumably on the grounds that proof that a merger is unlawful requires a demonstration only of a likelihood of restraint of trade and that the further proof of actual injury
required under § 4 obviates the antitrust injury requirement. Comment, Private Antitrust
Suits, supra note 8, at 883 n.41. In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent application of
Brunswick to three non-merger cases, this argument is no longer tenable. See Associated
Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S.Ct. 897, 908-10 (1983)
(Brunswick applied to coercive refusal to deal); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 48184 (1982) (Brunswick applied to conspiracy to suppress competition between psychologists
and psychiatrists); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561-63
(1981) (Brunswick applied to price discrimination).
- 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
63 Id. at 482 ("Brunswick... embrac[es] the general principle that treble-damages recoveries should be linked to the procompetition policy of the antitrust laws.").
8-103 S.Ct. 897 (1983).
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chiatrists but not by psychologists. McCready, a subscriber under
the plan, sought treble damages based on the cost of Blue Shield's
refusal to reimburse her for expenses incurred in seeing a psycholpgist. 0 Relying on Brunswick, the defendants argued that McCready did not pay artificially inflated fees for psychiatric treatment, but chose to continue seeing a psychologist; therefore, they
argued, her injury did not reflect the anticompetitive effect of the
alleged boycott. 9 1
A bare majority of the Supreme Court disagreed. As it had in
Brunswick, the Court framed its inquiry in terms of whether McCready's alleged injury "reflects Congress' core concerns in prohibiting the . . . defendants' course of conduct." 92 Finding McCready's injury to be "inextricably intertwined with the injury the
conspirators sought to inflict on the psychologists and the psychotherapy market," the Court held that McCready's injury fell
"squarely within the area of Congressional concern."9 3 The Court
neither rescinded nor purported to narrow the Brunswick requirement of antitrust injury. Rather, the Court found the Brunswick
test satisfied when participants in the relevant market refuse to
pay monopoly prices but then suffer direct market coercion as a
consequence of that decision.
In Associated General Contractors,the plaintiff union alleged
that the defendant, a multi-employer association with whom it had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement, coerced association
members and other third parties into hiring non-union subcontractors and encouraged non-members to refuse to bargain collectively
with the plaintiffs. 94 The union claimed that this coercion adversely affected the trade of unionized firms and restrained their
contracting activities.9 5 In an 8-1 decision,9" the Court held that
the complaint failed, as a matter of law, to allege an injury within
the meaning of section 4.97
In reaching this conclusion, the Court contrasted the plaintiff
union, "neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in
which trade was restrained,"9 8 with McCready, who was both a

:0 McCready, 457 U.S. at 467.
91Id. at 481.
92

Id.

93Id. at 484.
94 103 S. Ct. at 900-01.
9B Id.

at 899.

"Justice
:7 Id.

Marshall was the sole dissenter. Id. at 913.

at 900.

8 Id. at 909 (footnote omitted).
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participant in the relevant economic market (psychotherapeutic
services) and a direct victim of the defendants' unlawful coercion.9 9
The Court reasoned that the union's injury, unlike that of the subcontractors affected by the association's coercion, or of McCready,
primarily concerned its "labor-market interests," 100 not its economic freedom to participate in the contracting market. The Court
therefore held that the Brunswick requirement had not been
10 1
met.
Taken together, McCready and Associated General Contractors suggest that Brunswick cannot be read so strictly as to limit
antitrust recovery to plaintiffs who are forced to pay monopoly
prices or who suffer from restrictions of output, nor so broadly as
to allow recovery for injuries that bear no necessary relation to the
market effects of an alleged violation. As was true of the union in
Associated General Contractors, it is not clear whether employees
who refuse to participate in an antitrust violation "would be served
or disserved by enhanced competition in the market."'' 0 Therefore,
their "alleged injury must be analyzed to determine whether it is
of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall."10 3
The employees' complaint is not that their economic freedom in
the market affected by the employer's anticompetitive activity has
been limited; their injury is primarily to their labor-market interest in retaining their jobs on acceptable terms.0 4
The resemblance of the choice confronting these employees to
the "Hobson's Choice"' 5 presented to McCready, though superficially attractive, is ultimately misleading. Though both are given
the choice between participating in an anticompetitive scheme or
suffering injury, McCready's participation would have been as an

11

Id. at 910 n.44.

100 Id. at 910.
101 Id.
103

Id. at 909.
Id. at 910.

104

One commentator has suggested that "because at-will employees are not covered by

102

a separate body of federal labor law, the employees' antitrust concerns predominate." Note,
Employee Standing,supra note 8, at 1862. This argument assumes its conclusion. While the
Court in Associated General Contractorsobserved that the union's injuries were arguably
within the ambit of federal labor law, that observation was merely part of a larger inquiry
into whether the interests that the union alleged to have been injured were interests whose
protection would promote "uninhibited competition among employers." Only an affirmative
response to this inquiry, the Court noted, would constitute the union "part of the class the
Sherman Act was designed to protect." See 103 S. Ct. at 909-10. An employee's interest in
protection from unjust discharge, like a union's interest in improving working conditions,
will often be unrelated, if not opposed, to the interest of promoting competition.
105 McCready, 457 U.S. at 483.
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antitrust victim, the employee's as an antitrust violator. McCready's choice-that of paying monopoly prices by seeing a psychiatrist or incurring out-of-pocket losses by foregoing reimbursement-went to the "heart"1 0 6 of the anticompetitive scheme she
alleged. By forfeiting reimbursement, McCready simply deflected
the antitrust injury that "would have been borne" by competitors
in the market onto herself, and thereby bore immediately an injury
she and other consumers would inevitably have suffered "in the
10 7
form of suppressed competition in the psychotherapy market."
The employee who forfeits his job to protest what he perceives to
be an anticompetitive scheme, by contrast, faces a moral dilemma
divorced from the anticompetitive aspects of the allegedly unlawful
conduct and unrelated to his own economic freedom to participate
in the market threatened by the employer's anticompetitive designs. However necessary the employee's cooperation may be to the
success of the antitrust scheme, his injury, suffered for refusal to
cooperate, is not "inextricably intertwined"1 08 with its market
effects.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Courts and commentators have strained the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act to find within it protection for employees
who resist their employers' anticompetitive schemes. The temptation to do so is considerable, for these employees are uniquely well
situated to promote effective antitrust enforcement,10 9 and yet are
at risk of losing their jobs should they so act. State law offers some
protection for terminated employees in the form of wrongful discharge suits, 110 but wrongful discharge claims are not recognized in
206Id.
107

Id.

108

Id. at 484.

109

See Note, Employee Standing, supra note 8, at 1864-65; see also supra note 63

(antitrust violations particularly difficult for public to detect).
o10
The general rule of American employment, unlike that in any other industrialized
nation, is that a non-union, non-government employee is terminable at will. Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816, 1844 (1980); Comment, supra note 55, at 780, 782.
Termination can be for "good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong." Payne
v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). To mitigate counterproductive or inequitable results of this rule, courts in a minority of states-California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia (federal bankruptcy
court applying state law), Washington, and West Virginia-have created "public policy exceptions" to the employment-at-will doctrine. LABOR SPECIAL PRODUCTS UIT, THE BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ISSUE 8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
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the majority of states.1 1 1 Moreover, state courts should not be in
the business of making federal law enforcement a matter of state
public policy. Nonetheless, section 4 is an unsatisfactory answer to
this problem. Section 4 was intended to deter anticompetitive behavior, not to protect employees; it is not a thoughtful congressional regulation of employer-employee relations, nor a delicate
balance between the need for protection of whistle-blowing employees and the need for cooperation of employees in corporate operations. A full-scale trial to prove that a violation of the antitrust
laws has occurred should not be required for the protection of employees who act in a reasonable, good-faith belief that a violation
has occurred. Similarly, the strict civil liability that section 4 imposes on violators for any breakdowns in competition 1 2 seems inappropriate in the context of employee-employer relations, wherein
an employer should perhaps prevail upon a showing of a good faith
belief that its policies were lawful and that its employee, by his
recalcitrance, had become an obstacle to its operations.
Finally, the section 4 remedy is not well tailored to the unique
problems of insider suits. The statute makes no distinction among
the protections it would accord to rank-and-file employees, who
might rarely have knowledge of antitrust law standards or violative
schemes but have little freedom to choose how to perform their
jobs, to managers, who might have somewhat greater knowledge
and freedom but no voice in corporate decisions, and to officers or
directors, who have decision making power and a duty to abide by
the law. Treble damages may be inappropriate compensation for
those employees with little to lose and much to gain by bringing
suits in which they ordinarily have easier access to proof than does
the average antitrust plaintiff.11 s
BNA REPORT]; see Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal court looks to nonmaritime law and finds relief for employee fired in retaliation for
filing workmen's compensation claim); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (relief for employee discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (relief for employee terminated in retaliation for refusal to commit perjury in government investigation of employer's activities); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (relief for employee discharged in
retaliation for filing workmen's compensation claim); Scott v. Union Tank Car, 402 N.E.2d
992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (same); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dept. of Labor
Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981) (same).
" See, e.g., Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (5th Cir.
1981) (no right of action under Georgia or Texas law for employee terminated in retaliation
for testifying at antitrust trial); BNA REPORT, supra note 110, at 7-8.
"12 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978).
Is Although antitrust violations are often difficult for the public to detect, see supra
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That antitrust law is not suited, and state law not sufficiently
comprehensive, to protect employee refusals to participate in the
antitrust violations of their employers leaves a significant social
problem unattended. A better tool for safeguarding employees'
ability to resist antitrust violations would be a thoughtfully tailored no-retaliation amendment to the antitrust laws, rather than
an ad hoc extension of the reach of a statute whose structure and
content are not designed to deal with problems of employment relations. 114 In several other areas where Congress has deemed employee enforcement of the law desirable, federal law provides employees with protection against retaliation. Generally, such
protection is granted in statutes that regulate employer-employee
relations, such as the National Labor Relations Act,115 the Fair Labor Standards Act,116 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.117 In 1978, however, Congress passed a statute protecting
government employees who blow the whistle on unlawful governnote 63 and accompanying text, insiders generally have earlier and greater access to information about violations, see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
1'4 [D]irect legislation is a more effective and more appropriate method of promoting
[social] objectives [than the antitrust laws as written]. Within any plausible bounds of
statutory interpretation, antitrust law can at best make only a marginal contribution to
them. Moreover, the weighing and resolution of conflicting interests and objectives
would involve the courts in essentially political decisions for which there are no workable legal standards, and would often place them in a regulatory or supervisory role for
which they are ill-equipped.
1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNa, supra note 80, 105, at 13.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [rights of employees to organization,
collective bargaining, etc.];
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter[.]
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4) (1982).
118 [I]t shall be unlawful for any person (3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982).
127 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
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mental activities unrelated to employment regulation-the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978.118
To protect employees who disclose or resist their employers'
antitrust violations, Congress would need to adjust the burdens of
proof, the class of protected employees, and the level of damages
and other remedies available in such an action to achieve an appropriate level of antitrust enforcement and to strike the proper
balance between the interests of employees and employers-an undertaking beyond the scope of this comment. Nonetheless, the
Civil Service Reform Act might serve as a model for a no-retaliation statute designed to encourage employees to act as private attorneys general in enforcing the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION

Employees who are discharged for resisting their employers'
antitrust violations suffer injury that often goes unremedied under
present law. The treble-damage remedy of the Clayton Act is available only to those plaintiffs whose injuries result from the anticompetitive effects of monopolistic practices, and employee discharge
is a labor-market injury only peripherally related to the effects of
an employer's anticompetitive venture in the market over which he
seeks to exert control.
The majority of states does not allow suits by employees discharged for whistle blowing or resisting criminal activity. As a result, employees have little incentive to resist or disclose antitrust
violations and great reason to fear doing so. Yet employees are
I's Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 101(a), 92 Stat. 1114, 1116 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) (1982)). The Senate report reads in partOften, the whistle blower's reward for dedication to the highest moral principles is
harassment and abuse. Whistle blowers frequently encounter severe damage to their
careers and substantial economic loss.. . . Whenever misdeeds take place in a Federal
agency, there are employees who know that it has occurred and who are outraged by it.
What is needed is a means to assure them that they will not suffer if they help uncover
and correct administrative abuses.
S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong. 2d Seas. 8 (1978).
Michigan has enacted a similar statute, the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-.369 (West 1981). Section 15.362 reads in pertinent part- "An
employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee...
because the employee... reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule ... unless the employee knows that the
report is false ...... "The remedies provision of the statute, § 15.364, reads in pertinent
part- "A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this Act, shall
order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the payment of
back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any
combination of these remedies."
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uniquely powerful antitrust law enforcers, both because of their inside knowlege and because of the wrench that their resistance can
throw into employers' illegal plans. The Clayton Act is poorly
designed to protect such employees. Therefore it is Congress's task
to enact a no-retaliation law that strikes an appropriate balance
among the economic benefits of employee exposure of antitrust
violations, the employers' needs for cooperative employees, and
the employees' needs for protection from employers' retaliatory
practices.
Laurie N. Feldman

